

~~Downgraded to~~ CONFIDENTIAL

8 November 1962

Revised Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a report to be considered at the JCS meeting, 9 November 1962.

Subject: Supplement to JCS MCL - Outline for World-Wide Actions (U)
Master Check List (sub)

Background - On 27 Oct 62, TAB B - the Chairman, JCS directed that the Joint Staff prepare a supplement to the "JCS Master Check List for Cuban Operations", indicating the timely actions that the JCS should take on a world-wide basis in view of possible Soviet reaction to increased US military operations against Cuba.

- On 30 Oct 62, the Operations Deputies returned a J-3 outline responsive to this requirement for coordination with the Service Planners.

- On 1 Nov 62, the Operations Deputies again returned the outline for further consideration by J-3 and the Service Planners.

- On 6 Nov 62, the Operations Deputies approved the subject outline as a supplement to the JCS Master Check List for Cuban Operations.

- On 8 Nov 62, the Director, Joint Staff directed that the Outline for World-Wide Actions be placed on the JCS agenda for consideration on 9 Nov 1962.

Current Report - TAB A - contains a list of timely actions for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Service Comments - All Services have agreed that the actions listed are actions which, in concert with the appropriate political actions and in furtherance of the requisite political objectives, may warrant definitive development within the Joint Staff and the Services.

Comment and Recommendation - The current conditions of world crisis under which both the Joint Staff and the individual Service Staffs are functioning require that maximum staff effort be directed toward prompt and effective resolution of problems relating to the Cuban crisis, the developing Sino-Indian conflict, and the continuing Berlin confrontation.

- It should be noted that blanket approval of the some 29 courses of action set forth in this paper would result in generating a massive staff effort (both JCS and the Services) which could dilute to an unacceptable degree the effort currently being directed toward resolution of the major problems indicated above.

- The Director, J-3, recommends that the rationale underlying the Outline for World-Wide Actions be used as a basis for discussions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other agencies of the government, and that the specific actions included within the outline be developed in detail only as requisite political guidance is provided and with appropriate time-phasing.

Approved by: [Signature] Director, J-3

Opinion as to Recommendation: page 3, line 2: insert "at appropriate times" after word "taken"
Director, Joint Staff R (Concur) (Noneconcur)

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Col John H. Elder. USA Pat same insert in

DECLASSIFICATION BY JOINT STAFF
DATE: SEP 29 2000

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 71895

Return to Mr. Paul Kearney
Office, Chairman JCS
Room 2E865, The Pentagon

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 1

TOP SECRET

Supplement to
JCS MCL 8 Nov 1962

8 November 1962

DECLASSIFICATION BY JOINT STAFF
DATE: _____

SEP 29 2000

SUPPLEMENT TO THE JCS MASTER
CHECK LIST FOR CUBAN OPERATIONS

OUTLINE FOR WORLD-WIDE ACTIONS

OUTLINE FOR WORLD-WIDE ACTIONS

1. The actions proposed herein are designed to enhance the ability of the United States to contend with long- and short-term Communist reaction to events in Cuba. They support four basic objectives:

a. To wage an integrated world-wide political offensive against the Sino-Soviet Bloc, supported by appropriate military measures, to develop pressure points within the Bloc for subsequent exploitation.

b. To enhance credibility of our deterrent power and to increase the strength and resolve of our alliances.

c. To reconstitute and to round out our strategic capabilities while remaining ready rapidly and effectively to broaden military operations against Cuba.

d. To effect permanent improvement in the readiness and balance of our forces on a strategic scale.

2. These actions are founded in the conviction that the immediate aftermath of the President's declaration regarding Cuba is a most critical period which could constitute a turning point in our favor in the over-all East-West conflict; or, could become merely a temporary detente followed by even more persistent Communist pressures against US and Free World interests. These actions are to capitalize on any immediate advantages and to make the current crisis a turning point indeed. An essential accompaniment for these actions is a vigorous and concerted diplomatic and psychological exploitation of the current situation.

3. It is recognized that definitive actions cannot be taken with respect to many of the items suggested herein until specific political objectives have been provided. However,

at appropriate times TOP SECRET

this outline serves the purpose of suggesting military actions 1
which might be taken in concert with political action in 2
support of expanded national objectives. The individual 3
actions reflected herein will require further development within 4
the Services and the Joint Staff should the Joint Chiefs of 5
Staff elect to pursue them. 6

4. The military actions in Appendices A and B hereto, 7
related to the objectives in paragraph 1 above, are placed 8
in two categories: 9

a. Those actions which can be initiated *at appropriate times* in the short 10
term and which will be productive of an early impact on 11
the situation. These are shown in Appendix A. 12

b. Those actions which will require a more protracted 13
period for development and application. These are shown 14
in Appendix B. 15

ENCLOSURE A

ACTIONS FOR IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION

- 1. To develop pressure points within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. 1
 - a. Consider covert assistance to Chinese Nationalist 2

conduct of unconventional warfare and guerrilla operations 3

on the Chinese Mainland. 4

This could establish a pressure point for possible 5
 future exploitation, as well as constitute a drain 6
 on Communist Chinese resources and a rallying point 7
 for dissatisfied Chinese. 8
 - b. Consider expanding operations in Asia, to include 9

development of resistance movements in North Vietnam and 10

North Korea. 11

For 12 years we have joined the issues in Asia on 12
 Communist chosen grounds. Our highest aspiration 13
 here has been to "not lose." There has been nothing 14
 at issue to win, Conversely, the Communists have 15
 had nothing to lose. At worst they could "not win." 16
 We should take the initiative in this contest, with 17
 the immediate objective of forcing Ho Chi Minh to 18
 turn inward in North Vietnam to defend what he now 19
 has, and with similar action in North Korea. 20
- 2. To increase the strength and the will of our Alliances. 21
 - a. Consider designating specifically, where desirable 22

and feasible, the Army units which most likely would be 23

sent to Europe if a decision were made to reinforce USCINCEUR, 24

and sending advance parties from these units to Europe now 25

to complete planning which will facilitate attainment of 26

early post-deployment effectiveness. 27

This would constitute both a visible evidence of 28
 resolve and readiness, and a sound military measure 29
 to improve our capabilities. 30

b. Review our positions and objectives relative to Berlin and press for actions which will increase Allied capability and readiness to respond militarily.*

We should reassess our position in view of the current situation and consider expanding our operating objectives. Tripartite plans for military response to Soviet/GDR actions which impinge on US and Allied vital interests in Berlin are in a high state of development and ready for prompt implementation.

To enhance NATO capability for timely, cohesive military action, every reasonable pressure should be applied toward reaching early NATO agreement on:

- (1) Tripartite-NATO relationship paper.
- (2) Preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict.
- (3) BERCON/MARCON plans.

c. Consider proposing an increase in the number of NATO exercises as a vehicle for sustaining an improved readiness posture.

Western Europe is a critical area. With the commitments there, it is not likely to become embroiled in a Bloc/Free World collision short of general war. NATO posture is a reflection of the collective willingness and resolve of the NATO nations to run risks and to stand firm in defense or pursuit of important issues. Over a period of months, NATO could visibly improve its defensive readiness by rotating its troops through a series of field exercises. In addition to training value, these exercises could provide a covering force in critical areas.

* These actions, although fruition will be long-term, are identified as items for immediate consideration in view of the impending meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the necessity for early action with regard to US position and the tactics to be employed.

d. Consider initiating action to induce the United Kingdom to retain THOR missiles. 1 2

These missiles are programmed for early phase-out. 3
They provide visible and credible capability in a 4
deterrent role - though vulnerable, they could not 5
be eliminated from this deterrent role except by a 6
direct unequivocal attack on UK territory. Should 7
general war occur, these missiles provide a signifi- 8
cant contribution to the attack of Soviet MR/IRBMs 9
threatening Europe, particularly if a pre-emptive 10
option was required. 11

e. Consider measures to establish a more forthright position in the NAC regarding an MRBM for NATO.* 12 13

The requirement continues to exist for a NATO MRBM 14
to counter the Soviet IRBM/MRBM array which threatens 15
NATO. Unless positive action is taken at this time, 16
there is danger that this matter will come to be 17
accepted as a parallel to Soviet MRBMs in Cuba to 18
the detriment of long-term military capabilities. 19

f. Consider action in NAC to encourage early meeting of MC 26/4 force goals and NATO support and infrastructure requirements.* 20 21 22

With the current evidence of US resolve and the 23
strengthened psychological position in which we may 24
find ourselves, it is a propitious time to press for 25
attainment of force goals. Consideration might be 26
given to an increase in US commitment as an incentive 27
to other nations. Action should include the updating 28
of SACEUR's critical item shortage list for NATO 29

* These actions, although fruition will be long-term, are identified as items for immediate consideration in view of the impending meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the necessity for early action with regard to US position and the tactics to be employed.

Allies and determination of additional actions required 1
to alleviate shortages, and requesting NATO to expedite 2
necessary infrastructure projects. 3

g. Consider whether adjustments or expedited actions 4
are necessary in the Military Assistance Program. 5

There may be a requirement to increase combat capa- 6
bilities in key countries such as Greece, Turkey, 7
Iran, Pakistan, China, Korea, and internal security 8
in Latin America concurrent with provision of arms 9
to India. If considered necessary to make adjustments, 10
seek the CINCs' recommendations. Increased funding 11
will be required to cover any program increases. 12

3. To reconstitute and to round out our strategic reserve. 13

a. Consider the particular requirements for rounding 14
out STRICOM, the strategic reserve, by selective call-up 15
of Army and Air Force Reserve units to meet the requirements 16
of an anticipated range of contingencies. 17

Whatever the course of events in Cuba, we will undoubt- 18
edly need to be prepared, over an extended period, for 19
military action against Cuba. With forces set aside 20
for this job, our strategic reserve is unbalanced. 21
This is a vulnerability. The requirements for tactical 22
air squadrons, communications, and logistical support 23
units appear to be particularly critical in the event 24
of contingencies elsewhere. 25

b. Consider the highest sustainable level of readiness 26
in the Strategic Air Command, and the POLARIS force under 27
CINCLANT command, for various time periods and consider a 28
phased reduction to an appropriate level when Soviet offen- 29
sive weapon systems are out of Cuba, however they are 30
removed. 31

The current SAC/POLARIS readiness level probably 1
cannot be maintained indefinitely without an adverse 2
effect on over-all capabilities. We should foreclose 3
the possibility that these strategic forces might lose 4
some of their effectiveness as an essential part of 5
our actions in Cuba or elsewhere. 6

c. Consider means to assure increased responsiveness 7
to potential sealift/airlift requirements. 8

Support of Cuban contingency plans requires a sub- 9
stantial proportion of the MATS, MSTS and amphibious 10
shipping capabilities which are available. If these 11
plans are executed, timely action will be required 12
to re-establish the essential capability to meet 13
other potential requirements. This may require 14
authority for extension of commercial ship requi- 15
sitioning; diversion and positioning of MSTS ships; 16
activation of CRAF; civil airlift augmentation 17
available under the expansion provisions of the 18
current MATS contracts; or activation of some or all 19
of the Reserve Fleet of troop transports and LSTs. 20

d. Consider requesting the Secretary of Defense to 21
authorize the Services selectively to speed up critical 22
construction and procurement programs where operations are 23
currently limited or may be limited in the near future. 24

Cutbacks stemming from the Gold Flow problem have 25
delayed construction programs related directly to 26
the readiness of our forces. This includes such 27
items as nuclear weapons storage and construction 28
in support of the NATO air defense program. The 29
Services also are short critical items of combat 30
equipment and combat consumables the procurement 31
lead-times of which in some cases are so long as 32
to affect significantly combat deployment capabilities. 33

4. To effect permanent improvement in our forces on a
strategic scale:

Consider extending and expanding the Nuclear Test
Program.

Extend the test program. Continue proof tests of
stockpile weapons and more particularly the confidence
testing of complete weapon systems. Many of the new
devices recently tested have not been completely
successful and interpolation on the order of 100
times are required to estimate effects.

ENCLOSURE B

ACTIONS FOR LONG-TERM CONSIDERATION

1. To develop pressure points within the Sino-Soviet Bloc: 1
 - a. Consider expanding covert actions within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. 2
3
4 On a selective basis it should be possible to foment 4
5 disorder and discontent within the Communist Bloc. 5
6 In addition, it may be desirable to cause diversions in 6
7 the form of riots or sabotage in order to relieve 7
8 Communist pressure in adjoining areas. Each such 8
9 action should be designed to support achievement of 9
10 a specific objective. 10
2. To increase the strength and the will of our Alliances: 11
 - a. Consider becoming a signatory member of CENTO. 12
13 The current and foreseeable situations warrant the 13
14 United States joining CENTO in order to provide a 14
15 greater US presence and evidence of intention in 15
16 Middle East area. This action would contribute to 16
17 the solidarity and strength of the CENTO Alliance. 17
 - b. Consider capitalizing on the current situation to 18
19 bring India more closely into alignment with the West. 19
20 India is a key link between the Middle East and Asia. 20
21 Current difficulties in Ladakh and the North East 21
22 Frontier provinces could be used to resolve Indian/ 22
23 Pakistani disputes to our long-term benefits. Simul- 23
24 taneously we must recognize the interests of Pakistan, 24
25 a long-term ally. It may be possible to encourage a 25
26 resolution of major Pakistani/Indian external differ- 26
27 ences by a formal framework of alignment against 27
28 common enemies. 28

c. Consider increasing frequency of US military deployments overseas. 1
2

Increase frequency of US military exercises and 3
other training deployments to Western Europe, the 4
Middle East, and the Far East. Such deployments 5
would be a constant reminder to the Soviets and to 6
Allied countries of US ability to react to Communist 7
pressure points with an immediate strike capability. 8

d. Consider pressing discussions to lead to positioning of nuclear weapons in France. 9
10

US nuclear posture in Europe is unbalanced and 11
vulnerable because nuclear weapons cannot be posi- 12
tioned in France. Steps should be taken to correct 13
this situation through US/French nuclear cooperation. 14

e. Consider negotiations with Japan to bring it more fully into the Free World security structure. 15
16

Japan possesses a potential for support of a more 17
active Free World program in Asia. The lack of 18
governmental agreements to permit storage of nuclear 19
weapons in Japan affects adversely CINCPAC's readiness 20
posture. The new evidence of Soviet and Communist 21
Chinese aggressive designs furnishes a basis for new 22
approaches to the Government of Japan. 23

f. Consider development of a policy study relative to contingency plans and command arrangements for the use of combined forces in operations in the Western Hemisphere. 24
25
26

Present US plans do not include provision for the use 27
of combined forces in the Western Hemisphere. This. 28
subject is now under study at the State/ISA level. 29

g. Consider a reappraisal of our position on materiel support for our Allies. 30
31

Present restrictions do not permit computation of 32
requirements for our Allies, nor do they 33
permit procurement of assets for this purpose. The 34

items our Allies will require, in the event of large
scale conflict, generally require long lead-time. The
CINCS' recommendations and projected requirements
should be sought.

h. Consider expanding the scope of our present education
program to provide internal security training to all our
allies.

Expansion of this service, presently conducted for
Latin American countries, could improve the chances
for internal stability of governments friendly to
the US. The CINCS' recommendations and projected
requirements in this regard should be sought.

i. Consider measures to consummate a satisfactory nuclear
weapons arrangement with Canada.

US-Canadian arrangement to provide a nuclear capability
to Canada and for US forces in Canada have been held
in abeyance for an extended period because of Canadian
reluctance to consummate the necessary arrangements.
Canada should be pressed to complete these arrangements,
particularly those relating to air defense.

3. To effect permanent improvement in our forces on a
strategic scale.

a. Consider improvement of regular force readiness.

Effect permanent improvement to the readiness and
effectiveness posture of regular forces. Force
improvement will include the necessary construction,
modernization, and increases in manning, mobility,
supplies, war reserves, reserves, combat equipment,
and support units.

b. Consider expediting development and/or installation
of warning systems which will be effective against SLBMs.

With the Soviet Union unable to gain the advantage
of missiles in Cuba, increased priority may go to
SLBMs, perhaps supported from "fishing fleet" bases

in Cuba. We have spotty warning against submarines
and missiles, and a defense against short-range SLBMs
of exceedingly limited effectiveness attained
through modification of the NIKE HERCULES system.
Improvement of missile defense and submarine
detection systems should be prosecuted.

c. Consider acceleration of Civil Defense Programs.

The tensions attendant on US actions relative to
Cuba perhaps have generated intense interest in
Civil Defense programs. This would be a propitious
time to move ahead with public indoctrination and
with priority portions of the program.

d. Consider initiating a study of the adequacy of
Service authorizations for mobile communications and
electronics units.

Present and planned contingency communication
requirements have gravely reduced our capacity to
respond in new areas of tension or conflict. Long-
range plans for the National Communications Systems,
the National Military Command System, and expansion
of the Defense Communications System will eventually
provide increased capability. However, further
mobilization or commitment of forces will require
the use of mobile facilities.

e. Review the provisions of and provide necessary
modification to invoke selectively the "Command Relation-
ship Agreement between the Department of Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency" in all critical areas.

The Command Relationship Agreement should provide for
implementation in advance of hostilities so that there
is a minimum loss of control and effectiveness.

~~Downgraded to~~ CONFIDENTIAL

8 November 1962

Revised Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a report to be considered at the JCS meeting, 9 November 1962.

Subject: Supplement to JCS MCL - Outline for World-Wide Actions (U)
Master Check List (sub)

Background - On 27 Oct 62, TAB B - the Chairman, JCS directed that the Joint Staff prepare a supplement to the "JCS Master Check List for Cuban Operations", indicating the timely actions that the JCS should take on a world-wide basis in view of possible Soviet reaction to increased US military operations against Cuba.

- On 30 Oct 62, the Operations Deputies returned a J-3 outline responsive to this requirement for coordination with the Service Planners.

- On 1 Nov 62, the Operations Deputies again returned the outline for further consideration by J-3 and the Service Planners.

- On 6 Nov 62, the Operations Deputies approved the subject outline as a supplement to the JCS Master Check List for Cuban Operations.

- On 8 Nov 62, the Director, Joint Staff directed that the Outline for World-Wide Actions be placed on the JCS agenda for consideration on 9 Nov 1962.

Current Report - TAB A - contains a list of timely actions for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Service Comments - All Services have agreed that the actions listed are actions which, in concert with the appropriate political actions and in furtherance of the requisite political objectives, may warrant definitive development within the Joint Staff and the Services.

Comment and Recommendation - The current conditions of world crisis under which both the Joint Staff and the individual Service Staffs are functioning require that maximum staff effort be directed toward prompt and effective resolution of problems relating to the Cuban crisis, the developing Sino-Indian conflict, and the continuing Berlin confrontation.

- It should be noted that blanket approval of the some 29 courses of action set forth in this paper would result in generating a massive staff effort (both JCS and the Services) which could dilute to an unacceptable degree the effort currently being directed toward resolution of the major problems indicated above.

- The Director, J-3, recommends that the rationale underlying the Outline for World-Wide Actions be used as a basis for discussions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other agencies of the government, and that the specific actions included within the outline be developed in detail only as requisite political guidance is provided and with appropriate time-phasing.

Approved by: [Signature] Director, J-3

Opinion as to Recommendation: page 3, line 2: insert "at appropriate times" after word "taken"
Director, Joint Staff R (Concur) (Noneconcur)

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Col John H. Elder. USA Pat same insert in

DECLASSIFICATION BY JOINT STAFF
DATE: SEP 29 2000